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Christensen aims high with his approximately four hundred page-long work that
brings together fifteen years of contributions to debates between analytic philosophy
and phenomenology. Self and World – From Analytic Philosophy to Phenomenology (2008)
displays in depth knowledge of a wide array of twentieth century philosophers in
both analytic and continental tradition. The spirit of Christensen’s thinking is certainly
laudable and may serve as an example for all phenomenologists seeking to raise
a voice in contemporary philosophical discussions on perception, non-conceptual
experience and epistemology. In the Introduction, Christensen presents himself
as a true spokesman of the phenomenological tradition, seeking to draw analytic
philosophy and phenomenology closer without taking recourse to a today rather
commonplace subordination of the latter to the first.
Christensen lines up with Wright (1996) and others in questioning the success of
McDowell’s solution in Mind and World (1994) to the problem of oscillation discerned
there. In short, McDowell is taken by Christensen as representative of a tradition
perhaps not wholly unrelated to neo-Kantianism, which views experience as essentially
apophantic. Christensen thinks this approach covers up the essentially aesthetic
dimension of experience on which phenomenological accounts of perception expand.
This line of thought brings him to reconstruct McDowell’s philosophy in ways that
open it to more phenomenologically oriented readings. Importantly, Christensen’s
attempt at reconciliation of both strands of philosophy is characterized by a contra-
chronological transgression from McDowell’s thinking to the phenomenology of
Husserl and Heidegger. Reconstructing McDowell, it is said, will allow a "process
of letting past and present so illuminate one another that future possibilities are
opened up".1 Finally, Husserl’s account of perception is said then to pave the way for
a reconsideration of Heidegger’s Being and Time, one that can rightly acknowledge
the positive influence of Husserl on the development of Heidegger’s existential
phenomenology. In chapter I, Christensen expands on McDowell’s treatment of the
problem of oscillation in Mind and World. Chapter II continues to play out Davidon’s
"frictionless spinning"2 against McDowell’s attempt to avoid such position. Here
Christensen argues that Davidson’s account cannot incorporate the right kind of unity
of sensibility and understanding operative at the level of perception. In chapter III,
Christensen criticizes McDowell’s fear for confinement imagery. Chapter IV, V, VI and
VII give extra depth to these discussions by focusing on topics such as second nature,
externalism and finally phenomenology. Doubtlessly, Self and World profits from the
author’s smooth writing, which makes most discussions enjoyable to read. However,
a difficulty is that this book only represents one half of a more elaborate project.
1Christensen 2011, 11.
2McDowell 1994, 13-18.
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Discussions of Husserl and Heidegger are almost wholly excluded from this book. By
consequence, it is hard to judge whether Christensen manages to save the essentials
of Husserlian and Heideggerean phenomenology in light of the task of making it
relevant to analytic philosophy. Considered as a work of its own, many of the book’s
discussions are perhaps too lengthy and would have profited from some editorial
cutting. This length is, unfortunately, not compromised by a particularly wide scope,
although it is often met in terms of a considerable depth of the investigations. In spite
of this, I will in what follows show that Christensen seems on the right track in this
first division. I will try to highlight the ways in which Christensen’s reading in the first
three chapters contributes to an understanding of McDowell’s problem of oscillation
and how, in the following chapters, Christensen intends to exploit the soil laid by
McDowell for a phenomenological interpretation. In the final parts, I will also criticize
some aspects of his reading of Husserl. I take the first three chapters to elaborate
on three general topics: 1. The nature and legitimacy of McDowell’s critique of
Davidson in Mind andWorld, 2. The nature and legitimacy of McDowell’s own position
regarding the problem of oscillating between the Myth of the Given and coherentism,
3. The way we ought to reconstruct McDowell’s views in order to improve it. These
preparations ultimately serve to lay a foundation for another kind of unity in sensibility
and understanding than the one McDowell endorses, namely one which puts central
the idea that "not all ‘synthesis’ (predication) is ‘logical’ or apophantic, that indeed
there is an aesthetic kind as well".3 In other words, it is to lead us from Kantian active
synthesis governed by the understanding toward an originally passive synthesis in
the sense advocated by the later Husserl. McDowell’s philosophy takes central stage
throughout the book. According to McDowell, epistemology has suffered from a
certain dilemma for centuries, leading philosophers to oscillate back and forth between
two opposing and equally problematic positions regarding the nature of experience.
In order to account for the way thought grips onto reality, it seems necessary to
invoke an intermediary between our conscious thoughts and beliefs on the one hand
and external reality on the other. Classic empiricism draws on sensations to fulfill
this task. Sensations supposedly stand in immediate connection with reality, being
extra-conceptual, while simultaneously connecting to thought in such a way that they
can inform our thoughts about the way reality is. McDowell leans on Sellars (1963) in
criticizing this recourse to sensations but also goes beyond Sellars in rejecting that they
would play any separate role whatsoever. Because sensations in the classic sense are
taken to somehow inform our conceptual understanding while not being conceptual
themselves and thus really unknowable, Sellars calls the idea of it a Myth of the Given.
Put differently, the"‹idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of
justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere".4 In order
to avoid such an unaccountable Given, a rejection of it seems required, which in turn
leaves our thoughts hopelessly floating free with no connection to an external reality.
These two unsatisfactory ends make up the oscillatory state central to McDowell’s
thinking. McDowell’s own solution is, in short, to regard all of our perceptions as
already mediated by and open to conceptual activity. This way, the world is said to fall
within the grasp of our minds while simultaneously constraining our thoughts as an
independent though subject-mediated reality. Importantly, McDowell sees Davidson’s
coherentism as a representative of the second strand, which thus fails to account for
thought’s relation to the world. In the first two chapters of his book, Christensen first
pursues a line of argument saying that McDowell’s account of perceptual experience
3Christensen 2011, 60.
4McDowell 1994, 7.
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and the constraint it offers for empirical thinking is not substantially different from
Davidson’s. Although Christensen spends a lot of time trying to comprehend what
McDowell has in mind when he criticizes Davidson - something Davidson possibly
never quite understood himself5 - he ultimately lines up more or less with McDowell.
Although the merely causal role of sensations in Davidson’s model does not align
with the Given because it does not pretend to offer a rational constraint on our beliefs
- and thus does not extend the space of justification more widely than the space of
reasons - it is said still to fit the same traditional empiricist image. The reason for this
is that it similarly accounts for perceptual experience in terms of an interplay between
non-conceptual impressions and conceptual beliefs. In other words, Christensen takes
the locus of perceptual experience in Davidson to be wrong, since the combination of
distinct non-conceptual and conceptual elements does not allow for a genuine unity
between the impressional and conceptual. McDowell’s empirical synthesis, on the
other hand, has a privileged status with respect to Davidson’s, for it combines only
conceptually loaded elements, seeing thought’s bearing on reality secured by a notion
of perception as open to and informed by conceptual activity. What is required is a
"genuine [non-Davidsonean] unity of the conceptual and sensually and qualitatively
impressional",6 writes Christensen. Although this reading makes a lot of sense, I
think one could also argue in another direction. Christensen knows that we do not
have to read Davidson as wanting epistemic cross-fertilization between sensations
and beliefs; in fact Davidson rejects that sensations can have more than a causal role.
But it seems that the idea of a non-epistemic causal influence of sensations does not
necessarily have to exhaust the whole domain of sensibility. Why can’t there be, in
Davidson’s system, perceptions of the world that are belief-loaded and which can thus
cooperate with conceptual beliefs? Read this way, McDowell’s specific conception
of intuitions in Mind and World is not as such incompatible with Davidson’s account,
although McDowell’s rejection of causal influences on the perceiver does constitute a
strong departure from him. However, the possibility of such a complete exclusion of
the senses has in turn been criticized among others by De Vries (2011). For instance,
as De Vries points out, McDowell might still need extra-conceptual sense data as a
transcendental condition for coming to the adult human experiential world that he
is interested in. Consequently, there are other lines of argument that could support
McDowell’s affinity to Davidson.
In chapter three, the underlying aim of the reconstructive reading of McDowell and
the turn away from Davidson becomes more clear. Christensen holds that "conceptually
speaking, intentionality comes before causality".7 This means that the laws of nature
should come second to the way in which things appear to the experiencer, and
therefore the first cannot serve to explain the latter.8 Clearly, this does away instantly
with Davidson’s account. However, it is not entirely clear why this prioritization
of phenomena over empirical causality should be warranted. Why would it not be
equally fair to start with empirical reality and its natural laws, that is, the objective
world rather than the world of subjective appearing? The position Christensen then
ends on by the end of chapter three is, to my opinion, quite sophisticated. A sound
theory of perceptual experience requires McDowell’s adherence to the unity of intuition
and concept but should expel the fear he has for a confinement imagery which led
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the foundation for a phenomenologically inspired reconstruction of McDowell that
improves it. This reconstruction, I take it, agrees on McDowell’s prioritization of
subjective appearances over natural law, but disagrees with its prioritization of the
conceptual over the impressional. Christensen thus wants to keep the inseparability
of concept and intuition in McDowell, but not in a way that incorporates the latter into
the first. Only in parts of the final chapter and the conclusion does the reader get a
glimpse of what the author has in mind with such a phenomenological reconstruction.
Still, Christensen’s discussions of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in the light
of correcting theoretical biases and epistemological debates are arguably too shallow.
Christensen only treats Husserl’s general methodology and ‘meta-philosophy’, and
his assessments thereof do not reach far beyond stipulating the centrality of the first
person perspective and subsequently criticizing Husserl’s idea of a rigorous science.
Furthermore, he does not allude anywhere to Husserl’s posthumously published
phenomenological research and findings, and thereby cannot truly interpret how
Husserl’s phenomenology might disagree with the unity McDowell sees between
sensibility and understanding on the level of perception. Christensen thus ultimately
leaves unargued what I take to be one of his central claims: that McDowell’s account
of the unity of impression and concept in perceptual experience is one that could be
shared by phenomenologists.9 Against Christensen, I think Husserl could well be
interpreted as endorsing a pure passivity which is not informed by earlier conceptual
activities.10 Consequently, it seems that Husserl could be read to disagree with
McDowell’s perceptive unity, making room for non-conceptually informed sense-
makings as well. Christensen’s failure to address these issues might relate to his much
too narrow and partially incorrect account of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology
in the final sections. For one, he seems to deem transcendental phenomenology able
to address object-relative properties only, such as being-a-house, being-green, and
so forth, while stating it is unable to investigate subject-relative properties such as
being-too-heavy or travelling-dangerously-towards-me.11 I think this firstly shows a
lack of understanding of the nature of phenomenological method itself, particularly
genetic phenomenology, and secondly of Husserl’s actual research and findings in e.g.
Ideas II, Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis and Experience and Judgment.
The problem is that Christensen seems to endorse a traditional conception of Husserl’s
phenomenology as a continuation of Brentanean intentionality, according to which
Husserl would be intrinsically incapable of understanding the ontological structure of
human worldhood as Heidegger crystalized it in Being and Time – a view which since
decades has been falling into discredit.
With respect to the analytic parts of Self and World, one possible disappointment for
any reader is the restriction of nearly all of its discussions to McDowell and Davidson.
I think many topics could have been made a lot more substantial by drawing on
important contemporary scholarly work on non-conceptualism, e.g. Hubert Dreyfus,
Tim Crane, Sean Kelly or Robert Hanna, to name a few. For instance, the latter two12
take well-aimed shots at McDowell’s broad conception of concept in Mind and World
(‘demonstrative concepts’ in particular), in part using Kant’s 1786 essay What Does It
Mean To Orient Oneself In Thinking?. Discussions as these would have been useful for
broadening the scope of the book and relating it to important contemporary issues in




12Hanna 2008, 41-64, Kelly 2001, 397-420.
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All in all, Self and Worldhood is perhaps qua scope too narrow while it tends to
explore too many sidetracks of which it is not always clear what purpose they serve.
At times Christensen seems to have lost out of sight the primary aim of conveying his
most important findings to his reader and finds himself lost in a jungle of personal
thoughts he is trying to archive. In spite of this, it is evident that Christensen is a
mature thinker who has fully made McDowell’s and Davidson’s thinking his own.
Furthermore, I think he could be on the right track pursuing a phenomenological
re-reading of McDowell’s philosophy. In spite of some shortcomings, then, Self and
World is a solid work suitable mostly for anyone interested in the difficult relation
between McDowell and Davidson. Although the promise of a phenomenological
reading is left unfulfilled, it is definitely worth keeping an eye out for what could be
an interesting second part.
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